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Rational choice approaches to customary international law have gained 
in  prominence  in  recent  years.  Although  becoming  increasingly 
sophisticated, they are not able to explain all phenomena of customary 
international law. This contribution claims that there are two different 
types of unwritten law in the international order. On the one hand, we 
have the traditional customary norms, which are identified by observing 
patterns of state conduct and a related opinio iuris. These norms may very 
well be described by rational choice approaches, which primarily observe 
under  which  conditions  we  may  find  stable  patterns  of  behavior. 
However, there is, on the other hand, a different category of norms that 
functions  in  a  different  manner.  These  norms  concern  either  human 
rights or public goods and can be considered as the principles of the 
international legal order. Their function is not to stabilize already existing 
behavioral equilibria, but to shape international relations in a positive 
way. They are not past-oriented, but future-directed. Therefore, it is the 
thesis of this contribution that a deliberative approach is more suitable to 
explain the role of these principles in the international community. (JEL 
K 33) 
1. Introduction 
In recent decades, traditional international law doctrine has been under constant 
pressure of concurrent theoretical approaches. After the postmodernist critique in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, the most recent attack has come from rational 
choice theory. In 2005, ERIC POSNER  AND JACK GOLDSMITH’s account on The 
Limits of International Law [2005] replaced MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI’s Gentle Civilizer of 
Nations [2004] at the top of the bestseller list of international law books. However, 
Goldsmith and Posner’s work has not remained without opposition. Some authors 
have proposed different conceptions of customary international law on the basis 
of rational choice theory. Others have even questioned the basic assumption that 
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rational choice theory is a good fit for describing and explaining the functioning of 
international law. 
In this contribution, I will explore the role and the limits of game theory as a 
model for customary international law and try to contrast it with a deliberative 
approach. My thesis will be that neither of the two approaches will be able to give 
us a holistic account of present customary international law. However, it may be 
very fruitful to combine both of them in order to describe different aspects and 
phenomena of the international legal order. The analysis will proceed in three 
steps. First, I will describe the different approaches recurring to rational choice 
theory and explore their potential role in conceptualizing international law. In a 
second  step,  I  will  try  to  show  that  customary  international  law  is  basically 
composed of two different types of legal rules – coordinative and constitutional 
ones. Only the coordinative norms can be described by game theoretical accounts. 
Finally, I will propose to analyze the role and function of the constitutional norms 
by using deliberative theory. 
2. Rational Choice Theories and Customary International Law 
In recent years, there have been different attempts to conceptualize customary 
international law from a rational choice perspective. Custom is defined by the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice as “general practice accepted as law”
1 
and basically consists of two elements: a general practice and opinio iuris, the latter 
being that states perform this practice because they feel legally obliged to do so. 
Traditionally,  state  practice  was  the  crucial  constituent  element  of  customary 
international  law.  Inspired  by  sociological  positivism,  the  traditional  doctrine 
concentrated  on  finding  patterns  of  state  behavior  for  identifying  rules  of 
customary law [SCHACHTER 1982, 60; SIMMA 1995, 216]. This traditional approach 
is the basis for the majority of the game theoretical analyses of international law as 
they try to find such behavioral patterns through economic modeling [VERDIER 
2002,  864].  In  this  process,  the  various  approaches  differ  in  the  degree  of 
normativity they attribute to international law. 
                                                 
1   Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38 para. 1 lit. b, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 
1055, 1060.   3 
2.1. Law as a Label without Normative Force: Goldsmith & Posner 
The first and also the most critical account has been the analysis of customary 
international law by JACK GOLDSMITH AND ERIC POSNER [1999]. Goldsmith and 
Posner  assume  that  behavioral  regularities  in  international  relations  emerge  in 
international  games  played  among  states.  They  claim  that  all  observable 
international  behavior  can  basically  be 
reduced  to  four  different  situations: 
coincidence of interest, coercion, cooperation 
and  coordination.  In  the  coincidence  of 
interest  situation,  both  states  will  cooperate 
because they gain the highest individual pay-
off  from  cooperation  (table  1a).  In  the 
coercion setting, we have a weak state, which 
may engage in an action X, and a powerful 
state, which may coerce the weak state into 
not doing so. If the powerful state gains the 
most when the weak state does not perform 
X, it will, according to Goldsmith and Posner, 
impose  a  threat  so  that  the  weak  state  will 
abstain  from  X, even  if  X  would  otherwise 
have  led  to  a  positive  pay-off  because  the 
threat has altered the pay-off structure. 
The cooperation position is modeled after the 
prisoner’s  dilemma  game  (table  1b).  The 
highest  common  pay-off  is  attained  if  both 
states  cooperate.  However,  both  states  have 
individual incentives to defect so that they will defect in the Nash equilibrium. 
Goldsmith and Posner admit that cooperation may occur under certain conditions 
if  the  game  is  played  repeatedly,  as  will  mostly  be  the  case  in  the  reality  of 
international relations. However, they believe that cooperation is only possible in 
bilateral situations. Multilateral cooperation in prisoner’s dilemma games is held to 
be  impossible  because  of  the  high  costs  of  coordination.  Finally,  there  is  a 
coordination game, in which the states are indifferent which action to perform as 
long as they agree to do the same (table 1c). In these situations, the states will 
coordinate each other to perform one of the two simultaneous actions. 
Goldsmith  and  Posner  claim  that  behavioral  patterns  only  emerge  in  cases  of 
coincidence of interest, coercion, bilateral coordination games or bilateral repeated 
prisoner’s dilemmas. However, multilateral cooperation or coordination by means 
of custom never occurs because of the high costs of decentralized coordination. 
Furthermore, even in situations of bilateral cooperation, the cooperation would 
break down if the pay-off structure changed. Thus, Goldsmith and Posner claim 
that every behavioral pattern we can observe in international relations is driven by 
the self-interest of nations. Consequently, they deny that international law is an 
effective normative system and doubt its character of being law at all. 
Table 1: Games proposed by 
Goldsmith & Posner 1999 
a. Coincidence of interest 
  Defect  Cooperate 
Defect  -2, -2  -1, 2 
Cooperate  2, -1  3, 3 
b. Cooperation 
  Defect  Cooperate 
Defect  2, 2  4, 1 
Cooperate  1, 4  3, 3 
c. Coordination 
  X  Y 
Action X  3, 3  0, 0 
Action Y  0, 0  3, 3      
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2.2. Making Equilibria Salient: Edward Swaine 
The  contribution  of  Goldsmith  and  Posner  has  encouraged  other  scholars  to 
propose concurrent concepts of customary international law from a rational choice 
perspective. These alternative approaches attribute different degrees of normativity 
to  international  law.  EDWARD  SWAINE  [2002]  tries  to  extend  the  model  of 
Goldsmith and Posner by two games in order 
to show that international law has at least some 
normativity.  He  claims  that  the  picture 
presented by Goldsmith and Posner of possible 
behavioral  patterns  in  international  law  is 
incomplete. Instead, he points out two games 
in  which  law  might  have  an  effect  on  state 
behavior: the battle of the sexes and the stag 
hunt  game.  In  the  battle  of  the  sexes  game, 
states  have  preferences  for  different  actions 
(table  2a).  However,  coordination  is  more 
important  to  them  than  performing  the 
preferred action, even if they cooperate at the 
non-preferred  equilibrium.  As  an  example, 
Swaine  cites  the  designation  of the territorial 
seas. States may have preferred different rules 
of delimitation, the three-mile-rule being just one of them.  
However, some kind of cooperation was more important to them, then insisting 
on their preferred mode of delimitation. In the stag hunt game, there are two 
equilibria, either mutual cooperation or mutual defection (table 2b). Both states are 
individually better off if they both cooperate. However, the risk averse strategy is 
to defect because then the defecting state will have a certain pay-off regardless of 
what the other state does. Swaine thus perceives customary international law to be 
a means of communication. If there are two or more possible equilibria in a game, 
it is the function of law to highlight the right equilibrium in order to ensure that all 
states coordinate their actions on the equilibrium with the highest collective pay-
off.  This  position  is  in  line  with  some  recent  empirical  legal  studies  on  the 
expressive function of law, which claim that citizens often use law as a focal point 
in order to make one of different possible equilibriums in a game salient [BOHNET 
AND COOTER 2003; MCADAMS AND NADLER 2005]. 
2.3. Solving the Prisoner’s Dilemma: Norman & Trachtman 
While Swaine sees the value of customary international law only in its coordinative 
function, two other rational choice scholars, George Norman and Joel Trachtman, 
go even one step further: they claim that customary law is not only able to serve as 
a  communicative  means  in  order  to  select  one  equilibrium,  but  to  alter  the 
equilibrium of the game itself by changing the pay-off structure [NORMAN  AND 
TRACHTMAN  2005].  They  principally  concentrate  on  the  prisoner’s  dilemma 
Table 2: Games proposed by 
Swaine 2002 
a. Battle of the Sexes 
  X  Y 
X  3, 1  0, 0 
Y  0, 0  1, 3 
b. Stag Hunt 
  Cooperate  Defect 
Cooperate  5, 5  0, 3 
Defect  3, 0  3, 3   5 
situation, which had already been addressed by Goldsmith and Posner, but critique 
the latter for being to narrow in their analysis. If the prisoner’s dilemma game is 
played with indefinite repetitions, then players usually have incentives to cooperate 
because the long-term gain from cooperation is higher than the short-term gain 
from defection. Thus, Norman and Trachtman deem cooperation to be possible if 
the states are sufficiently patient, if the pay-offs from cooperation are sufficiently 
high  compared  to  the  gains  from  defection,  and  if  the  game  is  repeated 
indefinitely. Furthermore, they point out that prisoner’s dilemma games are usually 
perceived to be self-contained. The reality is different however, as states have the 
possibility of cross-sectoral punishment in case of defection, making cooperation 
even more likely. 
Norman and Trachtman rebut the claim that cooperation is generally not possible 
in multilateral situations. First, there may be situations in which the multilateral 
rule only concerns a series of bilateral relations, as will be the case with most 
norms  of  traditional  customary  international  law.  In  these  situations,  the 
considerations do not differ from those applying in simple bilateral relationships. 
They admit that it is less likely that customary rules will emerge in public-good-
situations,  in  particular  if  there  is  only  a  slight  individual  advantage  from 
cooperation. However, there may be factors favoring the development of rules 
protecting public goods: first, these are particular situations in which gains from 
cooperation increase with the number of participating states and the gains from 
defection decrease accordingly; and second, cooperation is more likely if states are 
included in an informal network of frequent legal or factual interactions and if 
defection is potentially harmful for membership in the network as such. It is thus 
wrong to conclude in general that multilateral rules of customary international law 
are impossible per se. 
2.4. Game Theory as a Thought Experiment: Andrew Guzman 
In contrast to the other rational choice approaches, which try to identify stable 
patterns of behavior, Andrew Guzman is concerned with the factors enhancing 
the effectiveness of international law [Guzman 2008]. He seeks to explain why 
states  may  comply  with  rules,  independent  of  their  actual  content.  Guzman 
identifies three factors securing the compliance of states with international law: 
reciprocity, retaliation and reputation. The core of his concept is the last of these 
factors  –  reputation.  Non-compliance  with  international  norms  has  a  negative 
effect on a state’s reputation, making it more difficult to enter into co-operations 
with other states in the future. Illegal behavior may thus impose additional costs 
on an international actor, which might outweigh the short-term gains of defection. 
The mere existence of a legal norm thus alters the pay-off structure of a game and 
may thus also alter the equilibria. 
Based on this assumption, Guzman’s theory of customary international law does 
not primarily  focus  on  behavioral  patterns  [GUZMAN  2005;  2008,  183-209].  A 
customary rule is instead established when it influences state behavior because of      
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its legal nature. Consequently, it is only the subjective evaluation of a legal rule by 
states that is relevant for determining their legal character. Guzman thus focuses 
on the identification of the opinio iuris. State practice may be an indicator in this 
respect;  however,  contrary  to  the  traditional  doctrine,  it  is  not  a  constituent 
element. The yardstick for the validity of customary international law is thus its 
expected effectiveness. 
2.5. Evaluation: The Explanatory Value of Rational Choice Models 
The aim of game theory is to predict the behavior of rational actors in certain 
situations. It is not a theory of the validity of legal norms and thus not able to tell 
us  which  norms  we  may  qualify  as  law  and  which  not  [CHINEN  2001,  145]. 
However, it may provide us with analytical tools in order to examine whether a 
norm or a system of norms fulfils the requirements set up by a specific theory. It is 
the underlying assumption of all rational choice approaches that the validity of law 
depends  on  its  effectiveness.  They  therefore  distance  themselves  from  the 
normative approaches of legal positivism, which try to determine the validity on 
the basis of formal criteria, such as deriving it from secondary rules of recognition 
[HART 1994].
2 
In analyzing the effectiveness of international law, the majority of the rational 
choice approaches show clear limitations. The decisive question is whether law 
influences state conduct only because of its character as law – independent of its 
content [AAKEN 2006]; or in rational choice terms: whether legal norms alter the 
pay-offs of a game because of being law and not just convention or cheap talk. 
Analyzing different behavioral patterns does not help us in this respect. They are 
very useful in explaining and predicting in which situations customary norms will 
or may emerge. They do not, however, tell us which role law plays in maintaining 
these behavioral patterns. 
It  is  the merit of  Andrew Guzman’s  account  to address  the  question  of  legal 
effectiveness  by  identifying  three  factors  contributing  to  content-independent 
compliance:  reciprocity,  retaliation  and  reputation.  By  particularly  focusing  on 
reputation, Guzman provides a convincing explanation for the effectiveness of 
certain norms of international law. Some problems do remain, however. On the 
one  hand,  legal  theories  determining  the  validity  of  norms  based  on  their 
effectiveness  run  into  difficulties  when  it  comes  down  to  drawing  concrete 
boundaries between law and non-law. Effectiveness is not a binary, but a gradual 
yardstick. As there will almost be no perfect compliance, we need to determine a 
certain amount of effectiveness as a criterion of separation. But where do we draw 
the  line?  Is  a  norm  not  to  be  considered  as  law  because  its  effectiveness  is 
measurable, but limited? What about observable changes in effectiveness? Is it 
relevant that a norm becomes increasingly effective or loses in effectiveness? 
                                                 
2   It is true that even positivism is not independent of effectiveness. According to Hart, the 
rules of recognition are those which are recognized as such by the relevant officials. However, 
effectiveness refers to the legal system as a whole and not to individual norms.   7 
On the other hand, rational choice approaches concentrate on self-interest and on 
states as comprehensive entities with fixed preferences. Theories regarding the 
state as a black box have limited explanatory power when foreign policy is, to a 
considerable  extent,  shaped  by  the  internal  deliberative  process.  Examples  are 
areas such as human rights or environmental law, where many developments are 
driven by non-state actors [KOH 1997, 2649]. Rational choice may explain why, 
e.g., human norms are, to a certain extent, less effective than rules that simply 
coordinate state behavior. This difference is, however, only of gradual nature. It is, 
thus, dangerous to use this observation in order to draw the normative conclusion 
that  such  norms  cannot  be  considered  to  be  law.  In  the  following,  this 
contribution turns to alternative approaches in order to seek an explanation for the 
functioning of this kind of legal norms.
3 
3. International Law between Coordination and Constitutionalization 
By focusing on behavioral patterns in their analysis of international law, rational 
choice scholars take a very traditional approach to international law, perceiving the 
international order as a system of coordination. In such a system reciprocity is the 
main glue [SIMMA 1970] so that it seems appropriate to describe the emergence of 
norms  through  bilateral  games.  However,  customary  international  law  has 
developed to a system transgressing the purely coordinative function. The present 
international legal order also seeks to protect goods and values which cannot be 
attributed to a specific state, but which are situated below or above state level, 
such as public goods or human rights [PAULUS 2001, 250-84; FASSBENDER 2003; 
KADELBACH 2004]. In European international law scholarship, this development 
is often described through the concept of constitutionalization [TOMUSCHAT 1999; 
FROWEIN 2000; WALTER 2001; DUPUY 2002; BOGDANDY 2006; KADELBACH AND 
KLEINLEIN 2007]. 
This evolution has also led to a transformation of the sources doctrine. While the 
observation of behavioral patterns traditionally was the centerpiece of identifying 
customary international law, modern scholarship preponderantly leans towards a 
more interpretative approach to customary law [PETERSEN 2008, 278-86]. There 
are different propositions in legal scholarship to dispense with state practice as a 
constituent  element of  custom  in certain  areas  of  international  law.  The  most 
prominent  of  these  approaches  has  been  Bruno  Simma  and  Philip  Alston’s 
classification  of  human  rights  as  general  principles,  liberating  the  latter  of  the 
requirement  to  be  backed  by  a  consistent  state  practice  [SIMMA  AND  ALSTON 
1992]. Other authors have proposed to abandon the practice requirement [SOHN 
1977,  133;  TESÓN  1998,  127]  or  at  least  to  downsize  its  importance  if  the 
respective norms have a moral impact [TASIOULAS 1996; ROBERTS 2001]. 
From this short overview, it has become obvious that the evolution of value-
related norms in international law seems to be the driving force behind the new 
                                                 
3   GUZMAN  [2008,  217]  himself  does  not  consider  his  approach  to  be  overarching  and 
comprehensive, but admits that liberal or constructivist approaches may well be complementary.      
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tendencies in legal scholarship. In legal theory, there are some approaches that take 
into account the differences of norms expressing a standard of behavior, on the 
one hand, and those dedicated to the protection of goods and values, on the other. 
The most convincing description of these differences is the theoretical distinction 
between rules and principles [DWORKIN 1977, 26-27; ALEXY 2002, 47-48]. The 
principal criterion to distinguish these two types of norms is their status in cases of 
norm collisions. The hierarchy of rules is static. When two rules collide, there is 
always a secondary rule that designates the prevailing rule for every imaginable 
case. In contrast, when two principles come into conflict, there is no abstract 
hierarchy  of  the  concurrent  norms.  Instead,  their  relationship  can  only  be 
determined with regard to a concrete case. It depends on a balancing of goods by 
taking into account the specific circumstances of each factual situation. 
In a world of conflicting goals and values, principles allow modern legal systems 
the  necessary  flexibility  to  deal  with  such  conflicts  [KUMM  2005,  220]. 
Consequently,  the  evolution  of  legal  principles  is  the  key  characteristic  of  the 
constitutionalization of international law, the transition of the international legal 
order to a modern legal system [KADELBACH AND KLEINLEIN 2007]. It is in line 
with  this  reasoning  that  principles  are  equally  the  crystallization  point  of  the 
modern sources doctrine. The distinction of rules and principles guides  us for 
determining whether state practice is a constituent element of legal norms. While 
rules have to be classified as traditional custom, being “general practice accepted as 
law”,
4 principles have to be qualified as general principles of law
5 dispensing with 
the practice requirement [PETERSEN 2008]. 
The reason for this differentiation lies in the functional difference of both types of 
norms. As principles always imply a balancing, they are necessarily goods-related. 
They do not refer to a specific type of conduct, but protect a certain value or good 
regardless  of  the  compromising  conduct.  Rules,  on  the  other  hand,  are 
preponderantly conduct-related. It is certainly possible to have value-related rules. 
The  protection  of  human  dignity  in  the  German  constitution  is  a  prominent 
example. However, as a system with a static legal hierarchy of values would be too 
inflexible, it is very unlikely that there exist very many of them. 
The state practice requirement for rules has a stabilizing function. As rules are in 
most cases directly reciprocal, states comply because they expect that the other 
members of the international community equally observe these rules. For rules, 
game theoretical models serve as an explanation why customary rules emerge in 
one  situation,  and  why  they  do  not  in  others.  The  situation  is  different  for 
principles. In their majority, principles are related either to public goods, which 
concern a group of states, or to individuals. In both situations, they thus concern 
goods distinct from individual states. If there is reciprocity at all, this reciprocity is 
diffuse at best [KEOHANE 1989]. Game theory struggles with these situations and 
some  scholars  are  quick  with  their  conclusion  that  principles  ought not  to be 
                                                 
4   See above, note 1. 
5   ICJ Statute (note 1) art. 38 para. 1 lit. c.   9 
qualified as law. It will, however, be the task of the following section to explore 
this question further and to explain the value of principles as legal norms. 
4. Constitutionalization and Discourse Theory 
In  seeking  an  answer  for  the  functioning  of  legal  principles,  constructivist 
approaches  to  international  law  might  guide  us.  Constructivism  assumes  that 
interests  and  preferences  of  international  actors  cannot  be  presupposed 
exogenously, but that they are shaped by social relations and processes as well as 
normative systems. The discourse between actors depends on a dense framework 
of principles, rules and norms, and international law provides such a framework 
[HABERMAS  2005,  387].  In  this  respect,  legal  principles  are  guidelines  for 
normative orientation [cf. KOSKENNIEMI 1985]. In order to clarify this point, I 
want to distinguish two functions of legal principles, which I will explain in more 
detail in the following: On the one hand, principles are supposed to rationalize and 
to structure the legal discourse; on the other, they have an evolutionary function 
shaping international relations by guaranteeing progressive compliance. 
4.1. Rationalizing and Structuring the Legal Discourse 
The  first  function  of  legal  principles  is  to  rationalize  and  structure  the  legal 
discourse, and to provide a framework of orientation for all kinds of actors on the 
international scene. This function affects different levels of impact. The first and 
most obvious effect of legal principles can be observed in the judiciary. Although, 
there is no institutionalized judicial system dealing with customary international 
law, legal matters of the international order may be relevant in different judicial 
proceedings. Examples are cases before the International Court of Justice, judicial 
bodies  of  specialized  treaty  regimes,  arbitral  tribunals  or  cases  before  national 
courts involving questions of international law. 
It is impossible for any legal order to provide a network of specific rules governing 
every legally relevant situation. As the international legal order is characterized by 
decentralized norm-creating procedures, this problem is even more virulent for 
international law than for national legal orders. It is, however, almost commonly 
accepted that a non liquet, the denial of a decision on the law in the relevant case, 
cannot be the result of a legal decision [LAUTERPACHT 1958; WEIL 1998]. In cases 
that are not covered by applicable rules, lawyers thus have to find alternative ways 
to balance conflicting interests. One classical approach to deal with such situations 
is the Lotus principle [S.S. “Lotus”, 1927 PCIJ (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7)]. According 
to this principle, a state may only be constrained by those rules to which it has 
consented. Any attempt to constrain a state’s freedom of action in the absence of 
an explicit prohibition is considered to be a violation of state sovereignty. 
However, in cases of conflicting interests, it often occurs that both parties rely on 
their sovereignty simultaneously. In such situations, the Lotus principle does not 
provide  us  with  a  suitable  solution  because  a  clear  delimitation  of  competing      
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liberties is not possible in an abstract way without recurring to further guidelines 
[KOSKENNIEMI 2005, 257]. Good examples are environmental standards related to 
global public goods, such as the Ozone layer or the marine environment. In this 
respect,  conflicts  may  arise  if  one  state  conducts  an  activity  that  damages  the 
Ozone layer or pollutes the Ocean, potentially causing harm to other states which 
may be especially affected by the reduced protection through the Ozone layer, or 
which  might  no  longer  be  able  to  use  the  Ocean  for  their  activities,  such  as 
tourism or fishing. 
In such a case, both parties may formally rely on their sovereignty. While the 
polluting state may refer to its sovereignty to perform any conduct that is not 
prohibited by a specific rule, the other states may claim to have a sovereign right 
not to be subject to harmful conduct. The core of the dispute is thus a pure 
balancing of competing interests. Such a balancing of interests may, however, only 
be accomplished by resorting to principles of equity. But a reasoning based on 
equity  will  be  even  more  difficult  and  arbitrary  in  multilateral  constellations 
concerning  public  goods  than  in  bilateral  relations.  In  the  absence  of  rules 
governing a certain situation, legal principles may increase the rationality of the 
legal  discourse,  as  they may  serve  as  authoritative  guidelines  for  balancing  the 
competing interests. They may play a particularly important role in relation to the 
protection of public goods, especially environmental goods, such as clean air or 
water. 
However, the structuring function of principles is not limited to judicial decisions. 
Legal principles also provide a system of orientation for a variety of actors in an 
uncertain world [RISSE 2003, 108]. In many cases, actors are not sure about their 
preferences because they lack the necessary information and do not have sufficient 
time and resources to obtain them. They may then use legal norms as guidelines 
for  their  behavior.  One  striking  example  is  the  incorporation  of  international 
human  rights  into  newly  emerging  constitutions  [GINSBURG  ET  AL.  2008]. 
Certainly, principles  will  often  be  too  abstract  in order  to  serve  as  a concrete 
guideline.  However,  law  does  not  always  have  a  direct  influence  on  human 
behavior [TOWFIGH 2008]. In many cases, not the legal standards themselves are 
yardsticks for individual conduct, but their social reflections, e.g., through judicial 
decisions.  In  this  respect,  courts  are  thus  mediators  between  the  law  and  the 
different actors of the international community. 
4.2. The Evolutionary Function of Legal Principles 
Let  us  now  turn  to  the  second  function  of  legal  principles,  the  evolutionary 
function. The starting point of this idea is the assumption that the effectiveness of 
legal norms is a gradual, not a binary concept. Norms are neither effective or 
ineffective; they are instead more or less effective. Even if one thus assumes that 
effectiveness factors in the determination of the validity of a legal norm, this does 
not presuppose that there has to be full compliance with this norm. If principles 
have  an  evolutionary  impact  on  behavior,  this  means  that  we  can  observe  an   11 
increasing compliance. The norm is not effective because every state complies 
with it at every point in time. Rather, it shapes the behavior of the actors in the 
international arena and thus effectuates an increase in the protection of the good 
being subject of the principle. 
We may illustrate this point by recurring to the deliberative spiral model of norms 
socialization, which has been developed by Thomas Risse and some colleagues in 
the field of human rights [RISSE 1999, 2000; RISSE  ET  AL. 2002; ULBERT  AND 
RISSE 2005]. Risse shows in several case studies how human rights obligations 
gradually affect the conduct of governments and finally force them to compliance. 
The  basic  idea  is  that  governments  enter  into  a  discourse  with  actors  of 
transnational advocacy networks, and are then caught in a deliberative entrapment. 
He distinguishes five different stages [RISSE 1999, 538]: repression, denial, tactical 
concessions, prescriptive status and rule-consistent behavior. 
In  the  first  stage,  the  transnational  advocacy  network,  which  is  formed  by 
international human rights NGOs, puts repressions and human rights violations 
on the international agenda. The initial reaction of the accused government will 
almost always be to deny the human rights violations either by denying the validity 
of the international human rights norms or the facts underlying the accusation. If 
international  pressure  continues  and  increases,  the  norm-violating  government 
seeks  to  pacify  international  criticism  by  performing  cosmetic  changes.  These 
cosmetic changes often open up opportunities to opposition groups at the national 
level.  Facing  pressure  from  two  sides,  the  international  community  and  the 
national  opposition,  some  repressive  governments  try  to  start  a  controlled 
liberalization,  while  others  miscalculate  and  are  overthrown  by  the  domestic 
opposition. These processes lead to a gradual increase of compliance with human 
rights obligations. 
In order to test his model empirically, Risse cites examples from the Philippines, 
Indonesia, Kenya, Uganda, Tunisia and Morocco, where an amelioration of the 
human  rights  situation  has  occurred  along  these  lines  [RISSE  ET  AL.  2002]. 
Obviously,  such  changes  do  not  happen  over-night.  The  time  frame  of  these 
changes can vary widely depending on the strength of the domestic opposition and 
the resources of the repressive government to initially fight off external pressures 
[RISSE 1999, 552]. However, even in such powerful countries as China, we can 
observe  progress  in  the  liberalization  of  the  Chinese  society.  This  progress  is 
marked, for example, by discussions about political reform within the communist 
party [BLUME 2008] or by an increasing participation of the public in the law-
making process [JULIUS AND PETERSEN 2006]. 
Similar deliberative patterns can be observed in the field of environmental law 
[KECK AND SIKKINK 1998, 121-63]. In this field, transnational advocacy networks 
cooperate with local NGOs in order to put governments under pressure. These 
networks  collect  information  from  different  sources,  like  scientists  or  local 
communities, in order to politicize the issues and make them known to the general 
public. Once these issues have been set on the agenda, national governments and 
international institutions have to address them and are forced to justify their own      
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conduct, which is often the first step towards an increasing compliance with legal 
norms. 
The decisive point in this process is that the governments accept the discourse on 
legal  standards  instead  of  rebutting  every  accusation  by  simply  denying  the 
existence of law. States are thus subject to reputational accountability. They have 
incentives at least to make others believe that they act according to legal norms in 
order to be accepted as members of the international community [RISSE 2003, 
116].  Admittedly,  reputational  accountability  does  not  necessarily  require  legal 
standards. But making a legal instead of a purely moral argument increases the 
legitimacy of a stipulation [BYERS 1999, 9]. 
The deliberative process is based on an interplay between different private and 
public  actors.  It  assumes  that  states  are  no  monolithic  entities  with  fixed 
preferences [SLAUGHTER 2000, 201]. They rather consist of different institutions 
and  agencies,  each  pursuing  different  interests.  They  are  often  influenced  by 
various social groups. This description does not only apply to a “world of liberal 
states” [SLAUGHTER 1995]. The more institutionalized an autocratic state is, the 
more likely it is that its government consists of different fractions trying to pursue 
their own agenda. Furthermore, they are not totally independent of public opinion. 
Even if private actors have no formal means of influence, they may nevertheless 
put the government under pressure in certain political issues by using transnational 
advocacy  networks  or  the  national  and  international  public.  In  such  an 
environment,  the  value  of  legal  principles  is  not  limited  to  guaranteeing 
compliance of state actors. They may also induce a process that leads to increasing 
compliance, which is driven by different forces of civil society. 
5. Conclusion: The Stabilizing and Evolutionary Character of Custom 
The preceding analysis aimed to show that customary international law consists of 
two different types of norms fulfilling different functions. The first category is 
traditional  custom.  Customary  rules  are  backward  looking,  being  identified  by 
observing state behavior in the past. Its principal function is to stabilize and to 
coordinate state conduct. However, modern international law is not limited to this 
stabilizing function. There is another type of norms, principles, which instead have 
an evolutionary impact on behavior. Instead of state practice, principles rely only 
on opinio iuris, as it is e.g. reflected through resolutions of various representative 
international institutions. Initial lack of compliance is innocuous for their legal 
character as long as there are signs of positive progression. 
In  order  to  conceptualize  these  different  types  of  norms,  we  have  to  rely  on 
different theoretical approaches. Rational choice theories are very illuminating in 
explaining the emergence of customary rules and in analyzing why states comply 
with them even if it does not lie in their short-term interest. However, they have 
rather limited explanatory power when it comes to the protection of human rights 
or  principles  of  environmental  law.  In  this  context,  constructivist  explanations 
inspired by discourse theory may be more apt to describe the underlying processes.   13 
Because  in  areas  such  as  the  environment  or  human  rights,  a  government’s 
preferences  are  not  constant,  but  may  be  shaped  by  the  political  process  and 
public discourse, the assumption of fixed preferences is not very helpful. It is thus 
dangerous to design a static conception of compliance and to draw normative 
consequences regarding the validity of legal norms from such a model. Much of 
international law’s potential lies instead in its evolutionary function, which is not 
directly  concerned  with  a  certain  status,  but  which  furthers  the  development 
towards this status. 
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